Cover: Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in PAPERBACK

Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy

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$33.50 • £26.95 • €30.00

ISBN 9780674004429

Publication: November 2000

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416 pages

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  • Editor’s Foreword
  • A Note on the Texts
    • Introduction: Modern Moral Philosophy, 1600–1800
      • 1. A Difference between Classical and Modern Moral Philosophy
      • 2. The Main Problem of Greek Moral Philosophy
      • 3. The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy
      • 4. The Problems of Modern Moral Philosophy
      • 5. The Relation between Religion and Science
      • 6. Kant on Science and Religion
      • 7. On Studying Historical Texts
  • Hume
    • I. Morality Psychologized and the Passions
      • 1. Background: Skepticism and the Fideism of Nature
      • 2. Classification of the Passions
      • 3. Outline of Section 3 of Part III of Book II
      • 4. Hume’s Account of (Nonmoral) Deliberation: The Official View
    • II. Rational Deliberation and the Role of Reason
      • 1. Three Questions about Hume’s Official View
      • 2. Three Further Psychological Principles
      • 3. Deliberation as Transforming the System of Passions
      • 4. The General Appetite to Good
      • 5. The General Appetite to Good: Passion or Principle?
    • III. Justice as an Artificial Virtue
      • 1. The Capital of the Sciences
      • 2. The Elements of Hume’s Problem
      • 3. The Origin of Justice and Property
      • 4. The Circumstances of Justice
      • 5. The Idea of Convention Examples and Supplementary Remarks
      • 6. Justice as a Best Scheme of Conventions
      • 7. The Two Stages of Development
    • IV. The Critique of Rational Intuitionism
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Some of Clarke’s Main Claims
      • 3. The Content of Right and Wrong
      • 4. Rational Intuitionism’s Moral Psychology
      • 5. Hume’s Critique of Rational Intuitionism
      • 6. Hume’s Second Argument: Morality Not Demonstrable
    • V. The Judicious Spectator
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Hume’s Account of Sympathy
      • 3. The First Objection: The Idea of the Judicious Spectator
      • 4. The Second Objection: Virtue in Rags Is Still Virtue
      • 5. The Epistemological Role of the Moral Sentiments
      • 6. Whether Hume Has a Conception of Practical Reason
      • 7. The Concluding Section of the Treatise
      • Appendix: Hume’s Disowning the Treatise
  • Leibniz
    • I. His Metaphysical Perfectionism
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Leibniz’s Metaphysical Perfectionism
      • 3. The Concept of a Perfection
      • 4. Leibniz’s Predicate-in-Subject Theory of Truth
      • 5. Some Comments on Leibniz’s Account of Truth
    • II. Spirits as Active Substances: Their Freedom
      • 1. The Complete Individual Concept Includes Active Powers
      • 2. Spirits as Individual Rational Substances
      • 3. True Freedom
      • 4. Reason, Judgment, and Will
      • 5. A Note on the Practical Point of View
  • Kant
    • I. Groundwork: Preface and Part I
      • 1. Introductory Comments
      • 2. Some Points about the Preface: Paragraphs 11–13
      • 3. The Idea of a Pure Will
      • 4. The Main Argument of Groundwork I
      • 5. The Absolute Value of a Good Will
      • 6. The Special Purpose of Reason
      • 7. Two Roles of the Good Will
    • II. The Categorical Imperative: The First Formulation
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Features of Ideal Moral Agents
      • 3. The Four-Step CI-Procedure
      • 4. Kant’s Second Example: The Deceitful Promise
      • 5. Kant’s Fourth Example: The Maxim of Indifference
      • 6. Two Limits on Information
      • 7. The Structure of Motives
    • III. The Categorical Imperative: The Second Formulation
      • 1. The Relation between the Formulations
      • 2. Statements of the Second Formulation
      • 3. Duties of Justice and Duties of Virtue
      • 4. What Is Humanity?
      • 5. The Negative Interpretation
      • 6. The Positive Interpretation
      • 7. Conclusion: Remarks on Groundwork 11: 46–49
    • IV. The Categorical Imperative: The Third Formulation
      • 1. Gaining Entry for the Moral Law
      • 2. The Formulation of Autonomy and Its Interpretation
      • 3. The Supremacy of Reason
      • 4. The Realm of Ends
      • 5. Bringing the Moral Law Nearer to Intuition
      • 6. What Is the Analogy?
    • V. The Priority of Right and the Object of the Moral Law
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. The First Three of Six Conceptions of the Good
      • 3. The Second Three Conceptions of the Good
      • 4. Autonomy and Heteronomy
      • 5. The Priority of Right
      • 6. A Note on True Human Needs
    • VI. Moral Constructivism
      • 1. Rational Intuitionism: A Final Look
      • 2. Kant’s Moral Constructivism
      • 3. The Constructivist Procedure
      • 4. An Observation and an Objection
      • 5. Two Conceptions of Objectivity
      • 6. The Categorical Imperative: In What Way Synthetic a Priori?
    • VII. The Fact of Reason
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. The First Fact of Reason Passage
      • 3. The Second Passage: §§5–8 of Chapter 1 of the Analytic
      • 4. The Third Passage: Appendix I to Analytic I, Paragraphs 8–15
      • 5. Why Kant Might Have Abandoned a Deduction for the Moral Law
      • 6. What Kind of Authentication Does the Moral Law Have?
      • 7. The Fifth and Sixth Fact of Reason Passages
      • 8. Conclusion
    • VIII. The Moral Law as the Law of Freedom
      • 1. Concluding Remarks on Constructivism and Due Reflection
      • 2. The Two Points of View
      • 3. Kant’s Opposition to Leibniz on Freedom
      • 4. Absolute Spontaneity
      • 5. The Moral Law as a Law of Freedom
      • 6. The Ideas of Freedom
      • 7. Conclusion
    • IX. The Moral Psychology of the Religion, Book I
      • 1. The Three Predispositions
      • 2. The Free Power of Choice
      • 3. The Rational Representation of the Origin of Evil
      • 4. The Manichean Moral Psychology
      • 5. The Roots of Moral Motivation in Our Person
    • X. The Unity of Reason
      • 1. The Practical Point of View
      • 2. The Realm of Ends as Object of the Moral Law
      • 3. The Highest Good as Object of the Moral Law
      • 4. The Postulates of Vernunftglaube
      • 5. The Content of Reasonable Faith
      • 6. The Unity of Reason
  • Hegel
    • I. His Rechtsphilosophie
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Philosophy as Reconciliation
      • 3. The Free Will
      • 4. Private Property
      • 5. Civil Society
    • II. Ethical Life and Liberalism
      • 1. Sitttichkeit: The Account of Duty
      • 2. Sittlickkeit: The State
      • 3. Sittlichkeit: War and Peace
      • 4. A Third Alternative
      • 5. Hegel’s Legacy as a Critic of Liberalism
  • Appendix: Course Outline