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Rescuing Justice and Equality

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Product Details

HARDCOVER

$58.00 • £45.95 • €52.00

ISBN 9780674030763

Publication: December 2008

Short

448 pages

6-1/8 x 9-1/4 inches

World

  • Preface
    • Introduction
      • 1. The Big Issue
      • 2. Rescuing Equality and Justice
      • 3. Some Methodological Disagreements
      • 4. Justice and Fairness
      • 5. The Two Standpoints
      • 6. The Greatness of John Rawls
      • 7. An Outline of the Book
  • I. Rescuing Equality from…
    • 1. The Incentives Argument
      • I. The Incentives Argument, the Interpersonal Test, and Community
        • 1. Incentives, the Difference Principle, and Equality
        • 2. Nigel Lawson’s Tax Cut
        • 3. On Uttering Arguments in Variable Interpersonal Settings
        • 4. The Kidnapper’s Argument
        • 5. Community, and the Interpersonal Test
        • 6. Does the Incentives Argument Pass the Interpersonal Test?
      • II. Testing the Incentives Argument
        • 7. What Makes the Minor Premise of the Incentives Argument True?
        • 8. Why the Incentives Argument Fails the Interpersonal Test
        • 9. The Incentives Argument and Bad Faith
        • 10. Should the Poor Reject the Incentives Argument?
        • 11. First Persons and Third Persons
      • III. Incentives and the Difference Principle
        • 12. Strict and Lax Readings of the Difference Principle
        • 13. Why Just People Must Practice the Strict Difference Principle
        • 14. The Difference Principle and “Daily Life”
        • 15. Dignity, Fraternity, and the Difference Principle
        • 16. The Difference Principle and “Mutual Indifference”
        • 17. The Difference Principle and the Unjust Society
    • 2. The Pareto Argument
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. The Argument Expounded
      • 3. The Argument Challenged
      • 4. The Argument Rejected
      • 5. Labor Burden in the Metric of Equality
      • 6. Inconsistent Metrics
      • 7. Raising the Baseline
      • 8. Impartiality and Mutual Advantage
      • 9. Inequality: A Necessary Evil?
      • 10. Conclusion
    • 3. The Basic Structure Objection
      • 1. “The Personal Is Political”
      • 2. Incentives and the Difference Principle: A Review of the Argument
      • 3. The Basic Structure Objection
      • 4. The Basic Structure Objection: A Preliminary Reply
      • 5. The Basic Structure Objection: A More Fundamental Reply
      • 6. Who Is to Blame?
      • 7. Coercive and Noncoercive Social Structures
      • Appendix I: More on Coercion and the Basic Structure
      • Appendix II: The Basic Structure Is a Structure
    • 4. The Difference Principle
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Reconsidering the Difference Principle
      • 3. The Moral Arbitrariness Case for the Difference Principle Contradicts Its Content
      • 4. A Recent Argument for the Difference Principle
      • 5. A Contractarian Argument for the Difference Principle
      • 6. What Is the Moral Arbitrariness of Talent Differences Supposed to Show?
      • 7. Chamberlain and Pareto
      • 8. “Can’t” or “Won’t”
      • 9. Human Nature and Constructivism
    • 5. The Freedom Objection
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Equality, Pareto, and Freedom of Choice of Occupation
      • 3. Equality, Pareto, and Rawlsian Liberty
      • 4. Equality, Pareto, and Freedom in Work
      • 5. The Unequal-Income Inference
      • 6. Blood, Kidneys, and Sex
  • II. Rescuing Justice from…
    • 6. The Facts
      • 1. A Statement of My Thesis
      • 2. Facts, and Some Meta-Ethical Questions
      • 3. What Most Philosophers Think about Facts and Principles
      • 4. My Thesis: Ultimate Principles Are Fact-Insensitive; and the Clarity of Mind Requirement
      • 5. An Illustration of the Thesis
      • 6. More Illustration of the Thesis
      • 7. The Argument for the Thesis
        • 7(i). A Defense of the First Premise of the Argument
        • 7(ii). A Defense of the Second Premise of the Argument
        • 7(iii). A Defense of the Third Premise of the Argument
      • 8. Still Further Illustration and Defense of the Thesis
      • 9. The Clarity of Mind Requirement
      • 10. The Merely Logical Priority of Fact-Insensitive Principles
      • 11. The Conditional Character of the Thesis
      • 12. On “Is” and “Ought”
      • 13. On “Ought” and “Can”
      • 14. Possible Misunderstandings of the Thesis
      • 15. The Thesis Is Not a Causal Thesis
      • 16. The Thesis Is Not a Psychological Thesis
      • 17. The Thesis Is Neutral with Respect to Central Meta-Ethical Disputes
      • 18. Some Bad Rawlsian Arguments That Reject My Thesis
      • 19. Utilitarianism, and the Difference Between Fundamental Principles and Rules of Regulation
      • 20. The Interest of My Thesis
      • Appendix: God
    • 7. Constructivism
      • 1. Introduction, and Preliminary Overview
      • 2. Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism
      • 3. Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism: Matters Arising
      • 4. Is Justice the First Virtue of Social Institutions?
      • 5. Two Illustrations: Social Insurance, Property Taxation
      • 6. Justice and the Pareto Principle
      • 7. Justice and Constraints, Notably Publicity, on Choice of Optimal Rules of Regulation
      • 8. Justice and Stability
      • 9. The “Circumstances of Justice”
      • 10. Conclusion
      • Appendix: Is the Original Position Justification of the Two Principles Contractarian?
    • 8. The Publicity Argument
      • 1. Andrew Williams on Publicity and the Egalitarian Ethos
      • 2. An Anatomy of Williams’s Argument
      • 3. Racism, Justice, and Assurance
      • 4. Does Assurance Williams-type Determinacy?
      • 5. Does Justice Require Precision?
      • 6. Egalitarian Ethoses at Home, in the Market, and in the State
      • 7. Publicity as a Desideratum of Justice
      • 8. Publicity and Occupational Choice
    • General Appendix: Replies to Critics
      • 1. Public and Private Action
      • 2. The Site of Justice Is Not Where It Gets Caused
      • 3. Prior Principles, Self-Respect, and Equality
      • 4. Incentives and Prerogatives
      • 5. Pogge’s Mastergoals and Supergoals
      • 6. Pogge’s Failure to Address the Standard Case
      • 7. The Currency of Distributive Justice and Incentive Inequality
      • 8. Earlier Discussions of Rawls on Incentives
  • Bibliography
  • Credits
  • Name Index
  • Subject Index

Awards

  • Shortlist, 2010 C.B. MacPherson Prize, Canadian Political Science Association
  • 2008 North American Society for Social Philosophy Book Award
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