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Commentaries on Plato, Volume 2: Parmenides, Part I

Marsilio Ficino

Edited and translated by Maude Vanhaelen

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$29.95 • £19.95 • €21.00

ISBN 9780674064713

Publication: August 2012

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    • Introduction
    • Commentary on the Parmenides
      • Argument
      • Preface
      • I. The arrangement of the Parmenides
      • II. How every being is one, but the One itself is above being
      • III. Every multitude participates in unity
      • IV. Existence and nature of Ideas
      • V. How Ideas differ from, and are in accordance with, one another
      • VI. What things have Ideas, what things have not. There are as many Ideas of rational souls as there are rational souls
      • VII. There is no Idea of matter
      • VIII. There are no Ideas of particulars
      • IX. There are no Ideas of parts
      • X. How there are Ideas of accidents
      • XI. There are no Ideas of artificial objects
      • XII. There are only Ideas of speculative sciences
      • XIII. There are no Ideas of evils
      • XIV. There are no Ideas of vile things
      • XV. Even the things that are not expressed by the Ideas themselves pertain to divine providence and the divine cause
      • XVI. Parmenides corrects or guides Socrates’ responses rather than refuting them
      • XVII. How earthly objects participate in Ideas as images of Ideas, and how there is no identical rational principle nor any common nature between them
      • XVIII. The Idea is not participated in a corporeal way so that it would be taken either as whole or as part
      • XIX. The Ideas of greatness, equality, and smallness are not participated according to a condition that would divide them into parts
      • XX. The Ideas are not aligned with material things either in nature or in condition
      • XXI. The mere fact that an association between many things exists should not make us assume the existence of a single Idea common to them
      • XXII. One should ascend from the species produced by the soul up to the species that are naturally in the soul, and from these up to the divine species
      • XXIII. The first species of things, which are also the principal objects of the intellect, precede the intelligences
      • XXIV. The Ideas are not intelligences but intelligible objects, and they precede intelligences
      • XXV. The property of the Idea in some way remains one in the whole chain, while its power varies
      • XXVI. The Ideas are not simple notions but natural species with a paradigmatic and efficient force
      • XXVII. The natural forms are said to be “like” the Ideas, but their Ideas should not be called “like” them
      • XXVIII. Contrary to the doctrines of the Stoics and the Peripatetics, the Ideas and all divine beings are separated from nature and at the same time have a power communicable to all things
      • XXIX. How the Ideas cannot be known by us, and also how they can
      • XXX. How the Ideas relate, or not, to earthly realities, and how the latter relate to the Ideas. On mastership and slavery yonder, and on the relationships between the Ideas
      • XXXI. How absolute knowledge is related to absolute truth and human knowledge is related to human truth. How the Ideas can or cannot be known
      • XXXII. On the mode of divine knowledge and providence
      • XXXIII. On divine mastership and cognition, and on the six orders of Ideas or forms
      • XXXIV. If the Ideas are not within God and the ideal formulae are not within us, there will be no dialectic or philosophy; there will be no demonstration, no definition, no division, and no analysis
      • XXXV. On the dialectical exercise leading to the intelligible species through the intermediary of the intellectual forms
      • XXXVI. The dialectical rules of hypothesizing that a thing is and is not, and the different meanings of the term “not-being”
      • XXXVII. Parmenides says that “the discussion will be arduous,” because it is not only logical but also theological
      • XXXVIII. On the hypotheses of the Parmenides and, following Plato’s words, on the One-and-Good, which is superior to being and intellect
      • XXXIX. Likewise, on the way in which Plato proceeds toward the first principle. On the name of the first principle. On the Idea of good
      • XL. Once again, the two Platonic ways to ascend toward the first principle, and the two names of the first principle
      • XLI. There follow the Platonic discourses demonstrating that the One is the principle of all things and that the One-and-Good is superior to being. First discourse
      • XLII. Second discourse on the same theme
      • XLIII. Third discourse on the same theme. On the simplicity of what is first and last
      • XLIV. Fourth discourse on the same theme. On the contemplation of the Good
      • XLV. Fifth discourse on the same theme. On the naming of the first principle
      • XLVI. Sixth discourse on the same theme. That we do not choose simply to be, but to be well and good
      • XLVII. Seventh discourse on the same theme. What the difference is between being and the Good
      • XLVIII. The principle of the universe is the absolute One, in any order the principle is that which is one to the highest degree. On the sun, nature and the intellect
      • XLIX. The first principle of nature is the Unity and Goodness above intellect, life and essence
    • Note on the Text
    • Notes to the Text
    • Notes to the Translation
    • Bibliography
    • Index