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Making it Explicit

Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment

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$46.00 • £33.95 • €41.50

ISBN 9780674543300

Publication: November 1998


768 pages

6-3/8 x 9-1/4 inches


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  • Preface
  • Part I
    • Toward a Normative Pragmatics
      • Introduction
      • From Intentional State to Normative Status
      • From Norms Explicit in Rules to Norms Implicit in Practices
      • From Normative Status to Normative Attitude
      • From Assessment to the Social Institution of Norms
      • From Intentional Interpretation to Original Intentionality
      • Appendix: Wittgenstein’s Use of Regel
    • Toward an Inferential Semantics
      • Content and Representation
      • The Priority of the Propositional
      • Conceptual Classification and Inference
      • Material Inference, Conceptual Content, and Expression
      • Circumstances and Consequences of Application
      • Conclusion
    • Linguistic Practice and Discursive Commitment
      • Intentional States and Linguistic Practices
      • Deontic Status and Deontic Attitudes
      • Asserting and Inferring
      • Scorekeeping: Pragmatic Significance and Semantic Content
    • Perception and Action: The Conferral of Empirical and Practical Conceptual Content
      • Assertions as Knowledge Claims
      • Reliability
      • Observation Reports and Noninferential Authority
      • Rational Agency
      • Practical Reasoning: Inferences from Doxastic to Practical Commitments
      • Intentions
  • Part II
    • The Expressive Role of Traditional Semantic Vocabulary: ‘True’ and ‘Refers’
      • From Inference to Truth, Reference, and Representation
      • Truth in Classical Pragmatism
      • From Pragmatism to Prosentences
      • Reference and Anaphorically Indirect Descriptions
      • The Function of Traditional Semantic Vocabulary Is Expressive, Not Explanatory
    • Substitution: What Are Singular Terms, and Why Are There Any?
      • Multivalued Logic and Material Inference
      • Substitution, Sentential Embedding, and Semantic Roles
      • Subsentential Expressions
      • What Are Singular Terms?
      • Why Are There Singular Terms?
      • Objections and Replies
      • Conclusion
      • Appendix: From Substitutional Derivation of Categories to Functional Derivation of Categories
      • Appendix: Sentence Use Conferring the Status of Singular Terms on Subsentential Expressions—An Application
    • Anaphora: The Structure of Token Repeatables
      • Frege’s Grundlagen Account of Picking Out Objects
      • Definite Descriptions and Existential Commitments
      • Substitution, Token Recurrence, and Anaphora
      • Deixis and Anaphora
      • Interpersonal Anaphora and Communication
      • Appendix: Other Kinds of Anaphora—Paychecks, Donkeys, and Quantificational Antecedents
    • Ascribing Propositional Attitudes: The Social Route from Reasoning to Representing
      • Representation and De Re Ascription of Propositionally Contentful Commitments
      • Interpretation, Communication, and De Re Ascriptions
      • De Re Ascriptions and the Intentional Explanation of Action
      • From Implicit Attribution to Explicit Ascription
      • Epistemically Strong De Re Attitudes: Indexicals, Quasi-Indexicals, and Proper Names
      • The Social-Perspectival Character of Conceptual Contents and the Objectivity of Conceptual Norms
      • Appendix: The Construction and Recursive Interpretation of Iterated Ascriptions That Mix De Dicto and De Re
      • Content Specifications
    • Conclusion
      • Two Concepts of Concepts
      • Norms and Practices
      • We Have Met the Norms, and They Are Ours
  • Abbreviations
  • Notes
  • Index