ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Topics and Aims

Structure of the Book and Links between the Topics

Method

PART 1: Rule-Following

CHAPTER 1: Kripke's Skepticism about Meaning

Assertion and Meaning

Kripke's Dialectical Skepticism

A First Look at Kripke's Understanding of Meaning

Assertion, Meaning, Truth Conditions, and Rules

The Rule Determines My Answer

Following and Being Guided by a Rule

The Normativity of Assertion and Meaning

Normativity, Past Intentions, and Future Use

Kripke's Skeptical Strategy

Kripke's Skeptical Challenge

The Challenge to Cite Facts That Determine What We Meant

Kripke's Skeptical Arguments

Kripke's Skeptical Conclusion

Kripke's Objectifying Move

Kripke's Metaphysical Realism

CHAPTER 2: Quine's Scientific Skepticism about Meaning

Dialectical Skepticism Contrasted with Scientific Skepticism

Quine's Scientific Naturalism

Naturalized Epistemology

Posits and Reality

From Naturalized Epistemology to Indeterminacy of Translation

Collateral Information and Stimulus Meaning

Inscrutability of Reference

The Limits of Objective Translation

Underdetermination and Indeterminacy

Inscrutability of Reference and Acquiescing in Our Mother Tongue

Logic, Disquotation, and Indeterminacy

L Quine's Objectifying Move

Quine's Objectifying Move Contrasted with Kripke's

CHAPTER 3: The Very Idea of a Participant Perspective

Toward a New Way of Looking at Meaning and Assertion

A Metaphysical Critique of Scientific Naturalism

The Fallacy of Subtraction

Is Quine's Scientific Naturalism a Kind of Idealism?

A Metaphilosophical Moral

A First Look at McDowell's Strategy

McDowell's Critique of Kripke

McDowell's Critique of Wright

McDowell's Trancendental Argument and the Middle Course

Two Problematic Assumptions of McDowell's Argument

A Metaphysical Realist Critique of McDowell's Arguments and His Middle Course

A Reply from Wright

A Reply from Quine

Do These Criticisms Rest on a Misunderstanding of McDowell?

The Methodological Moral

My Strategy in the Rest of the Book

PART 2: The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

CHAPTER 4: Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

Carnap's Project: The Codification of a Methodology for Rational Inquiry

Pure and Descriptive Semantics, Explicit Rules, and Language Systems

The Principle of Tolerance

A First Sketch of the Pragmatic Roots of Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

Quine's Criticism of the Thesis That Logic Is True by Convention

Carnap's Pragmatic Approach to Codifying Rules for Inquiry

Mistakes and Discoveries in Logic and Mathematics

'Analytic in L' in Terms of State Descriptions

'Analytic in L' in Terms of State Descriptions and Meaning Postulates

Pure and Descriptive Semantics

Reichenbach's Coordinative Definitions

The Analogy between Physical Geometry and Descriptive Semantics

Beth's Criticism of Pure Semantics

Carnap's Reply to Beth

CHAPTER 5: Quine's Reasons for Rejecting Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

A Strategy for Clarifying Quine's Dispute with Carnap

A Puzzling Exchange between Carnap and Quine

Carnap and Quine on Language and Logic

Carnap and Quine on the Interpretation of Artificial Notations

Quine on Truth by Convention Again

Preliminaries for Understanding Quine's Critique of Analyticity

Definition and Interchangeability

Semantical Rules

Postulates, Semantical Rules, and the Task of Logic

Indeterminacy and Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

Does Carnap Need a Criterion of Analyticity?

Holism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

Carnap's Method versus Quine's Doctrine

CHAPTER 6: Putnam's Reasons for Rejecting Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

Putnam and the Participant Perspective

The Roots and Strategy of Putnam's Arguments

Changes in Belief versus Changes in Reference

Law-Cluster Concepts and Terms

Framework Principles and the Contextually A Priori

An Objection from Carnap's Point of View

A Reply from Putnam's Point of View

Analyticity and One-Criterion Words

The Method behind Putnam's Criticisms

Why Putnam's Critique of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction is Incompatible with Quine's

Against Indeterminacy

Four Preliminary Concerns

PART 3: Anti-Individualism

CHAPTER 7: From the Rejection of the Analytic Synthetic Distinction to Anti-Individualism

The Participant Perspective and Anti-Individualism

Sameness of Reference despite Radical Changes in Belief

Idiolects, Disquotation and Changes in Belief

Kripke's Causal Picture of Reference

Putnam's Assimilation of Kripke's Causal Picture of Reference

Two Roles for the Causal Picture of Reference

The Division of Linguistic Labor and the Contribution of the Environment

The Standard Metaphysical Picture of the Contribution of the Environment

Two Versions of the Standard Metaphysical Picture

Donnellan's Puzzle

Vernacular Natural Kinds and Artifact Terms

The Division of Linguistic Labor across Time

Against Metaphysical Realism

Our Linguistic Obligations

Putnam's Causal Picture of Reference and Anti-Individualism

CHAPTER 8: Participation, Deference, and Dialectic

Anti-Individualism from Putnam to Burge

Burge's Starting Point, Content Clauses, and Notions

Step One of Burge's Arthritis Thought Experiment

Steps Two and Three of Burge's Arthritis Thought Experiment

Norms for Understanding, Conventional Linguistic Meaning, and Cognitive Value

Complete and Incomplete Understanding and the Structure of Burge's Thought Experiments

Essentialism and Rationalism about Notions

A Strategy for Deflating Burge's Anti-Individualism

Hare on Dancing the Eightsome Reel

Burge's Dialectic Deflated

A Deflationary View of Truth, Notions, and

CHAPTER 9: Realism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism

A Challenge from within the Participant Perspective

Realism and Self-Knowledge in Context

Self-Knowledge and Metalinguistic Beliefs

Problematic Possibilities

Why Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Is Incoherent

The Misunderstanding behind Skepticism about Self-Knowledge

Problematic Possibilities Disarmed

Empirical Presuppositions and Skeptical Possibilities

Two More Problematic Possibilities

Empirical Presuppositions and Skeptical Possibilities Again

Does Anti-Individualism Beg the Question against Skepticism?

Truth and the Absolute Conception of Reality

Nagel's Abstract Skepticism

The Dissolution of the Absolute Conception of Reality

CHAPTER 10: Anti-Individualism and Rule-Following

Rule-Following Reconsidered

Kripke's Dialectical Skepticism

Rule-Following from the Participant Perspective

How to Resist Kripke's Picture of Meaning and Assertion

A Skeptical Reply

Quine's Scientific Skepticism

How to Resist Quine's Picture of Meaning and Assertion

A Quinean Reply

NOTES

INDEX

Gary Ebbs is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.