Regulatory Takings
Law, Economics, and Politics
William A. Fischel
Preface
Introduction
1. Of Coase and Coal: Regulatory Takings in the U.S. Supreme Court
2. Eminent Domain's Democratic Origins and Economics Cycles
3. Constitutional Law, Process Theory, and Democratic Commitment
4. The Economic-Utilitarian Theories of Michelman and Esptein
5. Rational Expectations and Contractarian Conventions
6. Capitalizing on Land Use Regulation: Evidence from California
7. Zoning, Capitalization, and The Efficiency of Local Government
8. How Exit and Voice Discipline Government Excess
9. Remedies for Unfair Land Use Restrictions and Exactions
Case References
General References
Index



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