Preface

Introduction

I. Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control

1. U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s

2. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems

3. Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy

II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives

4. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure

5. Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory

6. Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination

7. Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions

8. The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors

Notes

References

Acknowledgments

Index

Author Photo: Brooks Kraft © 1997

Michael C. Jensen is Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration Emeritus, Harvard Business School.

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