Surprise Attack
The Victim's Perspective
Ephraim Kam
Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling
Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling
Introduction
PART I: THE COMPONENTS OF SUPRISE ATTACK
1. The Essence of Suprise Attack
Reaction to Disasters and Warnings
Aspects of Erroneous Estimates
The Strategic Warning
Surprise and Military Preparedness
2. Information and Indicators
Quality of Intelligence Information
Early Warning Indicators
Signal and Noise
Quantity of Intelligence Information
3. Intentions and Capabilities
Inference and Difficulties in Estimating Intentions
The Enemy's Conceptual Framework
Risk Taking by the Enemy
Estimating Capabilities
PART II: JUDGMENTAL BIASES AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
4. Conceptions and Incoming Information
The Set of Conceptions
The Persistence of Conceptions
Assimilating Information
Information and Expectations
Treating Discrepant Information
Cognitive Biases and Overconfidence
5. The Process of Analysis
Prediction and Intelligence Analysis
Stages of Intelligence Analysis
Approaches for Generating and Evaluating Hypotheses
Analogies and Learning from History
Evaluating Incoming Information
hoosing among Alternative Hypotheses
External Obstacles to Perception
Changing a View
PART III: THE ENVIROMENT
6. The Analyst and the Small Group
The Other Opinion
Groupthink
Pressures for Conformity
The Leader and the Expert
Group Risk Taking
7. Organizational Obstacles
The Military Organization
Rivalry, Coordination, and Communication
Intrinsic Problems in the Intelligence Organization
Military Men and Suprise Attack
8. Intelligence and Decision Makers
Decision Makers and Intelligence Production
Commitment to a Policy
How Decision Makers Affect the Intelligence Process
Decision Makers and Suprise Attack
Conclusion: Is Suprise Attack Inevitable?
The Complexity of the Problem
Why Safeuards Usually Fail
War without Surprise?
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Ephraim Kam is Deputy Head, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University, Israel.
Thomas C. Schelling is Distinguished University Professor, Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Harvard University. He is co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.