Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volumes I and II, Principles of Philosophy and Elements of Logic

Charles Sanders Peirce

Edited by Charles Hartshorne

Edited by Paul Weiss

    Introduction

    Preface

    BOOK I: GENERAL HISTORICAL ORIENTATION

    Chap. 1: Lessons from the History of Philosophy
    1. Nominalism
    2. Conceptualism
    3. The Spirit of Scholasticism
    4. Kant and his Refutation of Idealism
    5. Hegelism

    Chap. 2: Lessons from the History of Science
    1. The Scientific Attitude
    2. The Scientific Imagination
    3. Science and Morality
    4. Mathematics
    5. Science as a Guide to Conduct
    6. Morality and Sham Reasoning
    7. The Method of Authority
    8. Science and Continuity
    9. The Analytic Method
    10. Kinds of Reasoning
    11. The Study of the Useless
    12. Il Lume Naturale
    13. Generalization and Abstraction
    14. The Evaluation of Exactitude
    15. Science and Extraordinary Phenomena
    16. Reasoning from Samples
    17. The Method of Residual Phenomena
    18. Observation
    19. Evolution
    20. Some A Priori Dicta
    21. The Paucity of Scientific Knowledge
    22. The Uncertainty of Scientific Results
    23. Economy of Research

    Chap. 3: Notes on Scientific Philosophy
    1. Laboratory and Seminary Philosophies
    2. Axioms
    3. The Observational Part of Philosophy
    4. The First Rule of Reason
    5. Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution

    BOOK II. THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCE

    Proem: The Architectonic Character of Philosophy

    Chap. 1: An Outline Classification of the Sciences

    Chap. 2: A Detailed Classification of the Sciences
    1. Natural Classes
    2. Natural Classifications
    3. The Essence of Science
    4. The Divisions of Science
    5. The Divisions of Philosophy
    6. The Divisions of Mathematics

    BOOK III: PHENOMENOLOGY

    CHAP. 1: INTRODUCTION
    1. The Phaneron
    2. Valencies
    3. Monads, Dyads, and Triads
    4. Indecomposable Elements

    Chap. 2: The Categories in Detail
    A. Firstness
    1. The Source of the Categories
    2. The Manifestation of Firstness
    3. The Monad
    4. Qualities of Feeling
    5. Feeling as Independent of Mind and Change
    6. A Definition of Feeling
    7. The Similarity of Feelings of Different Sensory Modes
    8. Presentments as Signs
    9. The Communicability of Feelings
    10. The Transition to Secondness

    B. Secondness
    1. Feeling and Struggle
    2. Action and Perception
    3. The Varieties of Secondness
    4. The Dyad
    5. Polar Distinctions and Volition
    6. Ego and Non-Ego
    7. Shock and the Sense of Change

    C. Thirdness
    1. Examples of Thirdness
    2. Representation and Generality
    3. The Reality of Thirdness
    4. Protoplasm and the Categories
    5. The Interdependence of the Categories

    Chap. 3: A Guess at the Riddle
    Plan of the Work
    1. Trichotomy
    2. The Triad in Reasoning
    3. The Triad in Metaphysics
    4. The Triad in Psychology
    5. The Triad in Physiology
    6. The Triad in Biological Development
    7. The Triad in Physics

    Chap. 4: The Loom of Mathematics; An Attempt to Develop my Categories from Within
    1. The Three Categories
    2. Quality
    3. Fact
    4. Dyads
    5. Triads

    Chap. 5: Degenerate Cases
    1. Kinds of Secondness
    2. The Firstness of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness

    Chap. 6: On a New List of Categories
    1. Original Statement
    2. Notes on the Preceding

    Chap. 7: Triadomany

    BOOK IV: THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES

    Chap. 1: Introduction

    Chap. 2: Ultimate Goods

    Chap. 3: An Attempted Classification of Ends

    Chap. 4: Ideals of Conduct

    Chap. 5: Vitally Important Topics
    1. Theory and Practice
    2. Practical Concerns and the Wisdom of Sentiment
    3. Vitally Important Truths

    Indexes

  • Cover: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volumes I and II, Principles of Philosophy and Elements of Logic

Charles Hartshorne is Ashbel Smith Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas.

Paul Weiss is Heffer Professor of Philosophy at the School of Philosophy, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.