Roemer characterizes--correctly--the traditional Downsian model of political competition as one modeling competition between "opportunistic politicians" who themselves have no policy preferences and who choose instead to adopt positions that appeal to the preferences of the optimum number of voters. This, he says, is a misguided model, easy to use but empirically and theoretically inaccurate and producing meaningless results. He offers instead a more complex model...based on "parties in conflict," which have real policy preferences. Well written...[A] fine contribution to the literature on spatial modeling.
   --M. Berheide, Choice

Author photo: © Michael Marsland, Yale University Office of Public Affairs

John Roemer is Elizabeth S. and A. Varick Stout Professor of Political Science and Economics, Yale University.

Read More by John E. Roemer:

• Equality of Opportunity
• Free to Lose: An Introduction to Marxist Economic Philosophy
• A Future for Socialism
• Theories of Distributive Justice
• A General Theory of Exploitation and Class
• Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution: Multi-Issue Politics in Advanced Democracies