The Strategy of Conflict

Thomas C. Schelling

  • Thomas C. Schelling is Co-Recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy

1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy

2. An Essay on Bargaining

3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War

II. A Reorientation of Game Theory

4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision

5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves

6. Game Theory and Experimental Research

III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient

7. Randomization of Promises and Threats

8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance

IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust

9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack

10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament

Appendices

A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War

B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory

C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for "Noncooperative" Games

Index

  • Cover: The Strategy of Conflict
  • A photo of the author

photo: University of Maryland

Thomas C. Schelling is Distinguished University Professor, Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Harvard University. He is co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.