Preface

I. Shadows

1. A Terminological Interlude: Understandings

2. The Word-like Face of Shadows

3. The World-like Face of Shadows

4. Platonism

5. Essential Structure

6. Surrogates

7. Antiplatonism

8. Understandings Again

II. Thoughts and Talk

1. On Representing

2. Disambiguations

3. Sinn

4. On Representing Differently

5. Subjects and Predicates

III. Thoughts and Attitudes

1. What Thoughts Might Be

2. Equivalences

3. Approximatism

4. A Problem to Solve?

5. Alternatives

IV. Thoughts and Inference

1. A Role for Thoughts in Inference

2. What Logic Is About

3. Thoughts, Consequences, and Ways for Things to Be

V. Abilities to Think Things

1. Counting Thoughts

2. A Role for Abilities

3. Abilities

4. Plasticity

5. Generalizing

VI. Things to Think About

1. Properties and Truth

2. Ways for Things to Be

3. Structuring the Ways Things Are

4. Saying, and Thinking, the Same

VII. Thinking Things

1. Thinking-So

2. Classifying Attitudes

3. Epistemology

4. Surrogates Revisited

5. Thoughts

6. Thoughts and Sense

7. Mentioning Thoughts

8. Conclusion

VIII. Opacity, System, and Cause

1. Opacity

2. Are Attitude Ascriptions Opaque?

3. System

4. System Failures

5. Cause

IX. Situated Representing

1. Meaning and Shadows

2. Familiar Forms

3. Ordinary Practice

4. Scientism

5. Using Words

6. Meaning's Role

X. Truth and Sense

1. Truth

2. Correspondence

3. A Sensible Notion of Sense

4. Sense and Things

5. Sense and World

6. Circumstance

Notes

Index

Author Photo: Shane W. Davis

Charles Travis is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling in Scotland and the author of several books, including The Uses of Sense: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Language.