Cover: Political Competition: Theory and Applications, from Harvard University PressCover: Political Competition in PAPERBACK

Political Competition

Theory and Applications

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Product Details

PAPERBACK

$33.00 • £26.95 • €29.50

ISBN 9780674021051

Publication Date: 03/15/2006

Short

352 pages

5-11/16 x 8-15/16 inches

46 line illustrations, 22 tables

World

  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • 1. Political Competition over a Single Issue: The Case of Certainty
    • 1.1 Citizens, Voters, and Parties
    • 1.2 The Downs Model
    • 1.3 The Wittman Model
    • 1.4 Conclusion
  • 2. Modeling Party Uncertainty
    • 2.1 Introduction
    • 2.2 The State-Space Approach to Uncertainty
    • 2.3 An Error-Distribution Model of Uncertainty
    • 2.4 A Finite-Type Model
    • 2.5 Conclusion
  • 3. Unidimensional Policy Spaces with Uncertainty
    • 3.1 Introduction
    • 3.2 The Downs Model
    • 3.3 The Wittman Model: An Example
    • 3.4 Existence of Wittman Equilibrium
    • 3.5 Properties of Wittman Equilibrium
    • 3.6 Summary
  • 4. Applications of the Wittman Model
    • 4.1 Simple Models of Redistribution: The Politics of Extremism
    • 4.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium with Labor-Supply Elasticity
    • 4.3 Partisan Dogmatism and Political Extremism
    • 4.4 A Dynamic Model of Political Cycles
    • 4.5 Conclusion
  • 5. Endogenous Parties: The Unidimensional Case
    • 5.1 Introduction
    • 5.2 Average-Member Nash Equilibrium
    • 5.3 Condorcet-Nash Equilibrium
    • 5.4 Conclusion
  • 6. Political Competition over Several Issues: The Case of Certainty
    • 6.1 Introduction
    • 6.2 The Downs Model
    • 6.3 The Wittman Model
    • 6.4 Conclusion
  • 7. Multidimensional Issue Spaces and Uncertainty: The Downs Model
    • 7.1 Introduction
    • 7.2 The State-Space and Error-Distribution Models of Uncertainty
    • 7.3 The Coughlin Model
    • 7.4 The Lindbeck-Weibull Model
    • 7.5 Adapting the Coughlin Model to the Case of Aggregate Uncertainty
    • 7.6 Conclusion
  • 8. Party Factions and Nash Equilibrium
    • 8.1 Introduction
    • 8.2 Party Factions
    • 8.3 PUNE as a Bargaining Equilibrium
    • 8.4 A Differential Characterization of PUNE
    • 8.5 Regular Wittman Equilibrium
    • 8.6 PUNEs in the Unidimensional Model
    • 8.7 PUNEs in a Multidimensional Euclidean Model
    • 8.8 Conclusion
  • 9. The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Taxation
    • 9.1 Introduction
    • 9.2 The Model
    • 9.3 The Equilibrium Concepts
    • 9.4 Analysis of Party Competition
    • 9.5 Calibration
    • 9.6 Conclusion
  • 10. Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies
    • 10.1 The Historical Issue and a Model Preview
    • 10.2 The Politico-Economic Environment
    • 10.3 Analysis of PUNEs
    • 10.4 Empirical Tests
    • 10.5 Proofs of Theorems
    • 10.6 Concluding Remark
  • 11. Distributive Class Politics and the Political Geography of Interwar Europe
    • 11.1 Introduction
    • 11.2 The Luebbert Model
    • 11.3 Testing Luebbert’s Theory
    • 11.4 Introducing the Communists: A Three-Party Model
    • 11.5 Conclusion
    • 11.6 Methodological Coda
    • Appendix 11A
  • 12. A Three-Class Model of American Politics
    • 12.1 Introduction
    • 12.2 The Model
    • 12.3 Characterization of PUNEs
    • 12.4 Results
    • 12.5 Conclusion
  • 13. Endogenous Parties with Multidimensional Competition
    • 13.1 Introduction
    • 13.2 Endogenous Parties
    • 13.3 Taxation and Race
    • 13.4 Fitting the Model to U.S. Data
    • 13.5 Quadratic Taxation
    • 13.6 Private Financing of Parties
    • 13.7 A Technical Remark on the Existence of PUNEs
    • 13.8 Conclusion
    • 13.9 Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: Reprise
  • 14. Toward a Model of Coalition Government
    • 14.1 Introduction
    • 14.2 The Payoff Function of a Wittman Party
    • 14.3 An Example of Coalition Government: Unidimensional Wittman Equilibrium
    • 14.4 Multidimensional Three-Party Politics
    • 14.5 Coalition Government with a Multidimensional Issue Space: An Example
    • 14.6 Conclusion
  • Mathematical Appendix
    • A.1 Basics of Probability Theory
    • A.2 Some Concepts from Analysis
  • References
  • Index

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