- Preface
- Introduction
- 1. Political Competition over a Single Issue: The Case of Certainty
- 1.1 Citizens, Voters, and Parties
- 1.2 The Downs Model
- 1.3 The Wittman Model
- 1.4 Conclusion
- 2. Modeling Party Uncertainty
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 The State-Space Approach to Uncertainty
- 2.3 An Error-Distribution Model of Uncertainty
- 2.4 A Finite-Type Model
- 2.5 Conclusion
- 3. Unidimensional Policy Spaces with Uncertainty
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 The Downs Model
- 3.3 The Wittman Model: An Example
- 3.4 Existence of Wittman Equilibrium
- 3.5 Properties of Wittman Equilibrium
- 3.6 Summary
- 4. Applications of the Wittman Model
- 4.1 Simple Models of Redistribution: The Politics of Extremism
- 4.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium with Labor-Supply Elasticity
- 4.3 Partisan Dogmatism and Political Extremism
- 4.4 A Dynamic Model of Political Cycles
- 4.5 Conclusion
- 5. Endogenous Parties: The Unidimensional Case
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 Average-Member Nash Equilibrium
- 5.3 Condorcet-Nash Equilibrium
- 5.4 Conclusion
- 6. Political Competition over Several Issues: The Case of Certainty
- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 The Downs Model
- 6.3 The Wittman Model
- 6.4 Conclusion
- 7. Multidimensional Issue Spaces and Uncertainty: The Downs Model
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 The State-Space and Error-Distribution Models of Uncertainty
- 7.3 The Coughlin Model
- 7.4 The Lindbeck-Weibull Model
- 7.5 Adapting the Coughlin Model to the Case of Aggregate Uncertainty
- 7.6 Conclusion
- 8. Party Factions and Nash Equilibrium
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 Party Factions
- 8.3 PUNE as a Bargaining Equilibrium
- 8.4 A Differential Characterization of PUNE
- 8.5 Regular Wittman Equilibrium
- 8.6 PUNEs in the Unidimensional Model
- 8.7 PUNEs in a Multidimensional Euclidean Model
- 8.8 Conclusion
- 9. The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Taxation
- 9.1 Introduction
- 9.2 The Model
- 9.3 The Equilibrium Concepts
- 9.4 Analysis of Party Competition
- 9.5 Calibration
- 9.6 Conclusion
- 10. Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies
- 10.1 The Historical Issue and a Model Preview
- 10.2 The Politico-Economic Environment
- 10.3 Analysis of PUNEs
- 10.4 Empirical Tests
- 10.5 Proofs of Theorems
- 10.6 Concluding Remark
- 11. Distributive Class Politics and the Political Geography of Interwar Europe
- 11.1 Introduction
- 11.2 The Luebbert Model
- 11.3 Testing Luebbert’s Theory
- 11.4 Introducing the Communists: A Three-Party Model
- 11.5 Conclusion
- 11.6 Methodological Coda
- Appendix 11A
- 12. A Three-Class Model of American Politics
- 12.1 Introduction
- 12.2 The Model
- 12.3 Characterization of PUNEs
- 12.4 Results
- 12.5 Conclusion
- 13. Endogenous Parties with Multidimensional Competition
- 13.1 Introduction
- 13.2 Endogenous Parties
- 13.3 Taxation and Race
- 13.4 Fitting the Model to U.S. Data
- 13.5 Quadratic Taxation
- 13.6 Private Financing of Parties
- 13.7 A Technical Remark on the Existence of PUNEs
- 13.8 Conclusion
- 13.9 Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: Reprise
- 14. Toward a Model of Coalition Government
- 14.1 Introduction
- 14.2 The Payoff Function of a Wittman Party
- 14.3 An Example of Coalition Government: Unidimensional Wittman Equilibrium
- 14.4 Multidimensional Three-Party Politics
- 14.5 Coalition Government with a Multidimensional Issue Space: An Example
- 14.6 Conclusion
- Mathematical Appendix
- A.1 Basics of Probability Theory
- A.2 Some Concepts from Analysis
- References
- Index
Political Competition
Theory and Applications
Product Details
PAPERBACK
$34.00 • £29.95 • €30.95
ISBN 9780674021051
Publication Date: 03/15/2006
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