- Preface
-
- Introduction
- 1. The Big Issue
- 2. Rescuing Equality and Justice
- 3. Some Methodological Disagreements
- 4. Justice and Fairness
- 5. The Two Standpoints
- 6. The Greatness of John Rawls
- 7. An Outline of the Book
- Introduction
- I. Rescuing Equality from…
- 1. The Incentives Argument
- I. The Incentives Argument, the Interpersonal Test, and Community
- 1. Incentives, the Difference Principle, and Equality
- 2. Nigel Lawson’s Tax Cut
- 3. On Uttering Arguments in Variable Interpersonal Settings
- 4. The Kidnapper’s Argument
- 5. Community, and the Interpersonal Test
- 6. Does the Incentives Argument Pass the Interpersonal Test?
- II. Testing the Incentives Argument
- 7. What Makes the Minor Premise of the Incentives Argument True?
- 8. Why the Incentives Argument Fails the Interpersonal Test
- 9. The Incentives Argument and Bad Faith
- 10. Should the Poor Reject the Incentives Argument?
- 11. First Persons and Third Persons
- III. Incentives and the Difference Principle
- 12. Strict and Lax Readings of the Difference Principle
- 13. Why Just People Must Practice the Strict Difference Principle
- 14. The Difference Principle and “Daily Life”
- 15. Dignity, Fraternity, and the Difference Principle
- 16. The Difference Principle and “Mutual Indifference”
- 17. The Difference Principle and the Unjust Society
- I. The Incentives Argument, the Interpersonal Test, and Community
- 2. The Pareto Argument
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Argument Expounded
- 3. The Argument Challenged
- 4. The Argument Rejected
- 5. Labor Burden in the Metric of Equality
- 6. Inconsistent Metrics
- 7. Raising the Baseline
- 8. Impartiality and Mutual Advantage
- 9. Inequality: A Necessary Evil?
- 10. Conclusion
- 3. The Basic Structure Objection
- 1. “The Personal Is Political”
- 2. Incentives and the Difference Principle: A Review of the Argument
- 3. The Basic Structure Objection
- 4. The Basic Structure Objection: A Preliminary Reply
- 5. The Basic Structure Objection: A More Fundamental Reply
- 6. Who Is to Blame?
- 7. Coercive and Noncoercive Social Structures
- Appendix I: More on Coercion and the Basic Structure
- Appendix II: The Basic Structure Is a Structure
- 4. The Difference Principle
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Reconsidering the Difference Principle
- 3. The Moral Arbitrariness Case for the Difference Principle Contradicts Its Content
- 4. A Recent Argument for the Difference Principle
- 5. A Contractarian Argument for the Difference Principle
- 6. What Is the Moral Arbitrariness of Talent Differences Supposed to Show?
- 7. Chamberlain and Pareto
- 8. “Can’t” or “Won’t”
- 9. Human Nature and Constructivism
- 5. The Freedom Objection
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Equality, Pareto, and Freedom of Choice of Occupation
- 3. Equality, Pareto, and Rawlsian Liberty
- 4. Equality, Pareto, and Freedom in Work
- 5. The Unequal-Income Inference
- 6. Blood, Kidneys, and Sex
- 1. The Incentives Argument
- II. Rescuing Justice from…
- 6. The Facts
- 1. A Statement of My Thesis
- 2. Facts, and Some Meta-Ethical Questions
- 3. What Most Philosophers Think about Facts and Principles
- 4. My Thesis: Ultimate Principles Are Fact-Insensitive; and the Clarity of Mind Requirement
- 5. An Illustration of the Thesis
- 6. More Illustration of the Thesis
- 7. The Argument for the Thesis
- 7(i). A Defense of the First Premise of the Argument
- 7(ii). A Defense of the Second Premise of the Argument
- 7(iii). A Defense of the Third Premise of the Argument
- 8. Still Further Illustration and Defense of the Thesis
- 9. The Clarity of Mind Requirement
- 10. The Merely Logical Priority of Fact-Insensitive Principles
- 11. The Conditional Character of the Thesis
- 12. On “Is” and “Ought”
- 13. On “Ought” and “Can”
- 14. Possible Misunderstandings of the Thesis
- 15. The Thesis Is Not a Causal Thesis
- 16. The Thesis Is Not a Psychological Thesis
- 17. The Thesis Is Neutral with Respect to Central Meta-Ethical Disputes
- 18. Some Bad Rawlsian Arguments That Reject My Thesis
- 19. Utilitarianism, and the Difference Between Fundamental Principles and Rules of Regulation
- 20. The Interest of My Thesis
- Appendix: God
- 7. Constructivism
- 1. Introduction, and Preliminary Overview
- 2. Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism
- 3. Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism: Matters Arising
- 4. Is Justice the First Virtue of Social Institutions?
- 5. Two Illustrations: Social Insurance, Property Taxation
- 6. Justice and the Pareto Principle
- 7. Justice and Constraints, Notably Publicity, on Choice of Optimal Rules of Regulation
- 8. Justice and Stability
- 9. The “Circumstances of Justice”
- 10. Conclusion
- Appendix: Is the Original Position Justification of the Two Principles Contractarian?
- 8. The Publicity Argument
- 1. Andrew Williams on Publicity and the Egalitarian Ethos
- 2. An Anatomy of Williams’s Argument
- 3. Racism, Justice, and Assurance
- 4. Does Assurance Williams-type Determinacy?
- 5. Does Justice Require Precision?
- 6. Egalitarian Ethoses at Home, in the Market, and in the State
- 7. Publicity as a Desideratum of Justice
- 8. Publicity and Occupational Choice
- 6. The Facts
-
- General Appendix: Replies to Critics
- 1. Public and Private Action
- 2. The Site of Justice Is Not Where It Gets Caused
- 3. Prior Principles, Self-Respect, and Equality
- 4. Incentives and Prerogatives
- 5. Pogge’s Mastergoals and Supergoals
- 6. Pogge’s Failure to Address the Standard Case
- 7. The Currency of Distributive Justice and Incentive Inequality
- 8. Earlier Discussions of Rawls on Incentives
- General Appendix: Replies to Critics
- Bibliography
- Credits
- Name Index
- Subject Index


Rescuing Justice and Equality
Product Details
HARDCOVER
$65.00 • £56.95 • €59.95
ISBN 9780674030763
Publication Date: 12/15/2008
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Awards & Accolades
- Shortlist, 2010 C.B. MacPherson Prize, Canadian Political Science Association
- 2008 North American Society for Social Philosophy Book Award