- Introduction
- 1: Rational Explanation of Belief
- 1. q, so p
- 1.1 A New Variant of Moore’s Paradox
- 1.2 The Difference between Assertion and Demonstration
- 1.3 Demonstrations as Expressions of Believing-for-a-Reason
- 1.4 The Source of Moore-Paradoxicality
- 1.5 Believing-for-a-Reason Is Not a Process
- 1.6 Defending the Expressibility Thesis from Purported Counterexamples
- 1.7 On the Significance of the Expressibility Thesis
- 2. S Believes That p because q
- 3. S Believes That p because S Believes That q
- 3.1 The Simultaneity Constraint
- 3.2 The Epistemic Character of Believing-for-a-Reason
- 4. Rational Abilities
- 4.1 Three Species of Disposition
- 4.2 Differences between the Species
- 4.3 The Ability Underlying Believing-for-a-Reason
- 5. Anti-Psychologism about the Rational Explanation of Belief
- 1. q, so p
- 2: Rational Explanation of Action
- 1. Acting-for-a-Reason as Practical Thought
- 2. Objections
- 2.1 Objections to the Expressibility of Actions and Reasons for Action
- 2.2 Objections to the Identification of Evaluation with Intending to Act
- 2.3 Objections to the Identification of Evaluation with Acting
- 3. Instrumental Teleological Explanation
- 4. Anti-Psychologism about the Rational Explanation of Action
- 4.1 The Equivalence Thesis
- 4.2 Explaining the Rational Role of the Psychological Non-Psychologistically
- 3: (Non-Human) Animals and Their Reasons
- 1. Animals Are Responsive to Reasons
- 2. Animal Responsiveness to Reasons Is Epistemic
- 3. Objects of Knowledge versus Objects of Belief
- 4. Evidence Supporting Animal Belief Better Supports Animal Knowledge
- 5. An Argument against Animal Belief
- 6. Animal Agency
- 7. Explaining Belief versus Explaining Knowledge
- 8. Aside on Why Human (But Not Animal) Perception Is Conceptual
- 4: Rational Explanation and Rational Causation
- 1. Causation and Rational Explanation
- 1.1 Synthesizing Causal Concepts
- 1.2 Rylean Conceptual Analysis
- 1.3 Davidson’s Central Argument
- 1.4 Davidson on the Relation between Causation and Explanation
- 1.5 Steward on the Relation between Causation and Explanation
- 1.6 Kinds of Causation
- 2. Rational Causation
- 2.1 Rational Causation as the Manifestation of Rational Abilities
- 2.2 Objections
- 1. Causation and Rational Explanation
- 5: Events and States
- 1. Objects, Events, and Sortals
- 1.1 Object-Sortals
- 1.2 Event-Types
- 2. States and Events-in-Progress
- 2.1 States
- 2.1.1 States Are Dissective, Not Unitary
- 2.1.2 Two Kinds of Persistence
- 2.1.3 States Are Negatable
- 2.1.4 States Are Mass-Quantified
- 2.2 Events-in-Progress
- 2.1 States
- 1. Objects, Events, and Sortals
- 6: Physicalism
- 1. Physicalist Arguments Foiled
- 1.1 The Causal Analysis of Mental Concepts
- 1.2 The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality
- 1.3 The Causal Completeness of the Physical Realm
- 2. Physicalist Positions Refuted
- 2.1 Mental Events
- 2.2 Mental States and the Doctrine of Token-Identity
- 2.3. Mental States Are Not Physical
- 2.4 Mental Facts
- 3. Supervenience
- 1. Physicalist Arguments Foiled
- Acknowledgments
- Index


Rational Causation
Product Details
HARDCOVER
$55.00 • £47.95 • €50.95
ISBN 9780674059900
Publication Date: 03/20/2012