Commentaries on Plato, Volume 2: Parmenides, Part I

Introduction
Commentary on the Parmenides
- Argument
- Preface
- I. The arrangement of the Parmenides
- II. How every being is one, but the One itself is above being
- III. Every multitude participates in unity
- IV. Existence and nature of Ideas
- V. How Ideas differ from, and are in accordance with, one another
- VI. What things have Ideas, what things have not. There are as many Ideas of rational souls as there are rational souls
- VII. There is no Idea of matter
- VIII. There are no Ideas of particulars
- IX. There are no Ideas of parts
- X. How there are Ideas of accidents
- XI. There are no Ideas of artificial objects
- XII. There are only Ideas of speculative sciences
- XIII. There are no Ideas of evils
- XIV. There are no Ideas of vile things
- XV. Even the things that are not expressed by the Ideas themselves pertain to divine providence and the divine cause
- XVI. Parmenides corrects or guides Socrates’ responses rather than refuting them
- XVII. How earthly objects participate in Ideas as images of Ideas, and how there is no identical rational principle nor any common nature between them
- XVIII. The Idea is not participated in a corporeal way so that it would be taken either as whole or as part
- XIX. The Ideas of greatness, equality, and smallness are not participated according to a condition that would divide them into parts
- XX. The Ideas are not aligned with material things either in nature or in condition
- XXI. The mere fact that an association between many things exists should not make us assume the existence of a single Idea common to them
- XXII. One should ascend from the species produced by the soul up to the species that are naturally in the soul, and from these up to the divine species
- XXIII. The first species of things, which are also the principal objects of the intellect, precede the intelligences
- XXIV. The Ideas are not intelligences but intelligible objects, and they precede intelligences
- XXV. The property of the Idea in some way remains one in the whole chain, while its power varies
- XXVI. The Ideas are not simple notions but natural species with a paradigmatic and efficient force
- XXVII. The natural forms are said to be “like” the Ideas, but their Ideas should not be called “like” them
- XXVIII. Contrary to the doctrines of the Stoics and the Peripatetics, the Ideas and all divine beings are separated from nature and at the same time have a power communicable to all things
- XXIX. How the Ideas cannot be known by us, and also how they can
- XXX. How the Ideas relate, or not, to earthly realities, and how the latter relate to the Ideas. On mastership and slavery yonder, and on the relationships between the Ideas
- XXXI. How absolute knowledge is related to absolute truth and human knowledge is related to human truth. How the Ideas can or cannot be known
- XXXII. On the mode of divine knowledge and providence
- XXXIII. On divine mastership and cognition, and on the six orders of Ideas or forms
- XXXIV. If the Ideas are not within God and the ideal formulae are not within us, there will be no dialectic or philosophy; there will be no demonstration, no definition, no division, and no analysis
- XXXV. On the dialectical exercise leading to the intelligible species through the intermediary of the intellectual forms
- XXXVI. The dialectical rules of hypothesizing that a thing is and is not, and the different meanings of the term “not-being”
- XXXVII. Parmenides says that “the discussion will be arduous,” because it is not only logical but also theological
- XXXVIII. On the hypotheses of the Parmenides and, following Plato’s words, on the One-and-Good, which is superior to being and intellect
- XXXIX. Likewise, on the way in which Plato proceeds toward the first principle. On the name of the first principle. On the Idea of good
- XL. Once again, the two Platonic ways to ascend toward the first principle, and the two names of the first principle
- XLI. There follow the Platonic discourses demonstrating that the One is the principle of all things and that the One-and-Good is superior to being. First discourse
- XLII. Second discourse on the same theme
- XLIII. Third discourse on the same theme. On the simplicity of what is first and last
- XLIV. Fourth discourse on the same theme. On the contemplation of the Good
- XLV. Fifth discourse on the same theme. On the naming of the first principle
- XLVI. Sixth discourse on the same theme. That we do not choose simply to be, but to be well and good
- XLVII. Seventh discourse on the same theme. What the difference is between being and the Good
- XLVIII. The principle of the universe is the absolute One, in any order the principle is that which is one to the highest degree. On the sun, nature and the intellect
- XLIX. The first principle of nature is the Unity and Goodness above intellect, life and essence
Note on the Text
Notes to the Text
Notes to the Translation
Bibliography
Index

THE I TATTI RENAISSANCE LIBRARY

The I Tatti Renaissance Library 51

Marsilio Ficino

Edited and translated by Maude Vanhaelen

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