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Cover: Commentaries on Plato, Volume 2: <i>Parmenides</i>, Part II, from Harvard University PressCover: Commentaries on Plato, Volume 2: <i>Parmenides</i>, Part II in HARDCOVER

The I Tatti Renaissance Library 52

Commentaries on Plato, Volume 2: Parmenides, Part II

Marsilio Ficino

Edited and translated by Maude Vanhaelen

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HARDCOVER

$29.95 • £19.95 • €21.00

ISBN 9780674064720

Publication Date: 08/13/2012

Short

  • Commentary on the Parmenides
    • L. On unity above essence, on unities in essences, on the gods, on the general purpose of Parmenides in the hypotheses
    • LI. The arrangement of the dialogue’s hypotheses according to Plutarch
    • LII. The significance of the negations and the assertions in the hypotheses, what things are dealt with in them, and in what order
    • LIII. The purpose, truth, and structure of the first hypothesis
    • LIV. When the properties of beings are denied of the One, it signifies that the One transcends and creates all these things
    • LV. On the one being, the absolute One, and the purpose of Parmenides in this dialogue and in his poem. The purpose and summary of the negations
    • LVI. On the universal being and its properties, and how these are denied of the first principle. Which multitude is denied of the One, and why
    • LVII. By denying multitude we also deny “parts” and “whole” of the One. Number precedes beings; every multitude partakes of unity. The first essence, life, and mind are identical
    • LVIII. The opinion according to which one can assert abstractions of abstracts about God. Also, negations and comparisons are safer for characterizing God
    • LIX. If the One has no parts, it has consequently no beginning, end, or middle
    • LX. How the One is said to be infinite and the limit of all things
    • LXI. How the attributes “shaped,” “straight,” and “round” are denied of the One
    • LXII. The One is nowhere, because it is neither in itself nor in another. Similarly, the way in which separate things are said to exist or be produced by themselves
    • LXIII. How the One is said to be neither at rest nor in motion and how motion and rest exist in all things but the first principle
    • LXIV. The One is not moved in a circle or in a straight line
    • LXV. The way in which rest is denied of the One
    • LXVI. The five genera of being, the three levels of negations, the ten categories denied of the One, and some considerations on “the same” and “the other”
    • LXVII. The One is not other than itself, nor the same as another, and it is separate from all conditions
    • LXVIII. The One is not other than the others
    • LXIX. The One is not the same as itself
    • LXX. The One is not like or unlike itself or another
    • LXXI. The One is not equal or unequal to itself or to the others
    • LXXII. Confirmation of what has been said above
    • LXXIII. The One cannot be younger or older than, or of equal age with, itself and the others
    • LXXIV. The One is above eternity, time, and motion, and can by no means be said to be in time
    • LXXV. The rule of relative terms confirming what has been said above
    • LXXVI. Since the One transcends time, it consequently transcends temporal conditions and temporal realities
    • LXXVII. The One does not participate in essence; it is neither essence nor being, but is by far superior to them
    • LXXVIII. Under which condition essence and being are denied of the One. Likewise, why the One cannot be known or named
    • LXXIX. On the validity of the first hypothesis. On the superiority of the One over being
    • LXXX. The purpose of the second hypothesis
    • LXXXI. How the rational principle of the One is different from that of being within the one being, and the whole has parts and an infinite multitude
    • LXXXII. All numbers are contained in the one being by virtue of the numbers two and three. These numbers precede the distribution of the one being within the multiple beings
    • LXXXIII. How essence and the one are together distributed in the intelligible world, and how multitude is limited or infinite
    • LXXXIV. How, in the intelligible world, the multitude of parts is contained in the double form of the whole. How it possesses limits, a middle, and shapes
    • LXXXV. How the one being is in itself and in another than itself
    • LXXXVI. How the one being is always at rest and in movement
    • LXXXVII. The one being is the same as, and different from, itself. Similarly, it is the same as, and different from, the others
    • LXXXVIII. The one being is like and unlike itself and the others
    • LXXXIX. How the one being has, and has not, contact with itself and with the others
    • XC. How the one being is equal and unequal to itself and to the others
    • XCI. How the one being is equal, superior, and inferior in number in relation to itself and to the others
    • XCII. How the one being is said to be older, younger, and equal in age, in relation to itself and the others
    • XCIII. How to distinguish between becoming older and younger and being older and younger. Conclusion on the one being
    • XCIV. Summary or epilogue of the second hypothesis. Regarding the distinctions of divine realities
    • XCV. Distinctions in this summary or epilogue. On the one being, multitude, infinite number, and the orders of gods
    • XCVI. Third hypothesis. The purpose of the hypothesis. The way in which the soul is called being and not-being. On motion and time within the soul. On a certain eternal thing belonging to it. Again, how by a kind of sharing of itself it represents all things
    • XCVII. The way in which the celestial soul is moved and accomplishes circular motion around the mind, which remains motionless. The number of motions in the soul. How many kinds of motion and rest there are in time, and on the mean between motions
    • XCVIII. Summary or epilogue of the third hypothesis. On the one, multitude, being, not-being, motion, rest, moment, time, and opposition. Motion in relation to motion and rest
    • XCIX. Fourth hypothesis. The purpose of the fourth hypothesis. The whole that precedes the parts, the whole that follows the parts, the divine realities, the natural realities, the relation of the parts with their whole
    • C. How multitude relates to the one; on infinity and limit as elements of beings; on all the others which are opposed to one another
    • CI. Fifth hypothesis. The purpose of the fifth hypothesis. On the one and others that come from the one, whether the one is in accordance with them. On the omniform being, and on formless matter
    • CII. Confirmation of what has been said. How matter possesses no formal conditions within itself. Similarly, whence matter exists, is formed, and is moved
    • CIII. Sixth hypothesis. Purpose of the sixth hypothesis. In what way Parmenides is poetic. On being and not-being
    • CIV. How the one, when it is said not to be, can also be in some way understood as being, and how this not-being can be known; on the soul
    • CV. How the one, which is said to be not-being, is the soul’s nature; its principle of motion; that there is knowledge of this not-being; otherness, multitude, and indicative signs that pertain to it
    • CVI. Unlikeness, likeness, inequality, equality, greatness, smallness, and essence in a certain sense exist in respect of this one not-being. On the soul
    • CVII. The acts of being and not-being, motion, alteration, dissolution, and their opposites exist in respect of this one not-being. On the soul
    • CVIII. Seventh hypothesis. Purpose of the seventh hypothesis. On the degrees of the one, being, and not-being. How all things are denied of the one and of not-being
    • CIX. Eighth hypothesis. Purpose of the eighth hypothesis. If mind is subtracted and soul remains, soul will be untruthful and will concern itself with shadows
    • CX. If we suppose that the one is not, things themselves will cease to exist, there will be shadowy, innumerably infinite masses, and opposites will occur in respect of the same thing. Imagination, always ambiguous, will be untruthful
    • CXI. Ninth hypothesis. Purpose of the ninth hypothesis
  • Note on the Text
  • Notes to the Text
  • Notes to the Translation
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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