- Preface
- Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior
- Bibliographic Notes
- 1. Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game
- The Normal Form Game
- Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
- The Nash Equilibrium
- Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
- Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
- Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
- The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- 2. Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
- The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
- A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
- Subgame Perfection
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- 3. Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation
- Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
- The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
- Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
- Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
- Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation
- Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
- Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- 4. Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information
- Signaling and Screening
- Modeling Nonverifiable Information
- Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
- Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
- Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- 5. Reputation and Repeated Games
- Backwards Induction and Its Limits
- Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
- Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- 6. Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models
- Collective Action and the Role of Law
- Embedded Games
- Understanding the Structure of Large Games
- Collective Action and Private Information
- Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
- Herd Behavior
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- 7. Noncooperative Bargaining
- Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
- Legal Rules as Exit Options
- Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
- Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- 8. Bargaining and Information
- Basic Models of the Litigation Process
- Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
- Information and Selection Bias
- Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law
- Notes
- References
- Glossary
- Index
Game Theory and the Law
Product Details
PAPERBACK
$49.00 • £42.95 • €44.95
ISBN 9780674341111
Publication Date: 09/01/1998
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