Cover: Game Theory and the Law, from Harvard University PressCover: Game Theory and the Law in PAPERBACK

Game Theory and the Law

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Product Details

PAPERBACK

$47.50 • £38.95 • €43.00

ISBN 9780674341111

Publication Date: 09/01/1998

Short

344 pages

6-1/8 x 9-1/4 inches

47 line illustrations

World

  • Preface
  • Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior
    • Bibliographic Notes
  • 1. Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game
    • The Normal Form Game
    • Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
    • The Nash Equilibrium
    • Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
    • Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
    • Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
    • The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes
  • 2. Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
    • The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
    • A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
    • Subgame Perfection
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes
  • 3. Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation
    • Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
    • The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
    • Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
    • Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
    • Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation
    • Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
    • Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes
  • 4. Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information
    • Signaling and Screening
    • Modeling Nonverifiable Information
    • Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
    • Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
    • Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes
  • 5. Reputation and Repeated Games
    • Backwards Induction and Its Limits
    • Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
    • Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes
  • 6. Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models
    • Collective Action and the Role of Law
    • Embedded Games
    • Understanding the Structure of Large Games
    • Collective Action and Private Information
    • Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
    • Herd Behavior
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes
  • 7. Noncooperative Bargaining
    • Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
    • Legal Rules as Exit Options
    • Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
    • Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes
  • 8. Bargaining and Information
    • Basic Models of the Litigation Process
    • Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
    • Information and Selection Bias
    • Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
    • Summary
    • Bibliographic Notes
  • Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law
  • Notes
  • References
  • Glossary
  • Index

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