Game Theory

Preface
1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations
- 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence
- 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory
- 1.3 Axioms
- 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem
- 1.5 Equivalent Representations
- 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems
- 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model
- 1.8 Domination
- 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems
- Exercises
2. Basic Models
- 2.1 Games in Extensive Form
- 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation
- 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games
- 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations
- 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies
- 2.6 Multiagent Representations
- 2.7 Common Knowledge
- 2.8 Bayesian Games
- 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information
- Exercises
3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games
- 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability
- 3.2 Nash Equilibrium
- 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria
- 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria
- 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect
- 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games
- 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance
- 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
- 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria
- 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria
- 3.11 Auctions
- 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium
- 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets
- Exercises
4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games
- 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies
- 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies
- 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability
- 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States
- 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria
- 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
- 4.7 Games with Perfect Information
- 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability
- 4.9 Forward Induction
- 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas
- 4.11 Technical Proofs
- Exercises
5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 Perfect Equilibria
- 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria
- 5.4 Proper Equilibria
- 5.5 Persistent Equilibria
- 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria
- 5.7 Generic Properties
- 5.8 Conclusions
- Exercises
6. Games with Communication
- 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies
- 6.2 Correlated Equilibria
- 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication
- 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems
- 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility
- 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts
- 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games
- 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria
- 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games
- Exercises
- Bibliographic Note
7. Repeated Games
- 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
- 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet
- 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting
- 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples
- 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games
- 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt
- 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves
- 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups
- 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- 7.10 Continuous Time
- 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games
- Exercises
8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games
- 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory
- 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution
- 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility
- 8.4 Transferable Utility
- 8.5 Rational Threats
- 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions
- 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game
- 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information
- 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game
- 8.10 Renegotiation
- Exercises
9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games
- 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis
- 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility
- 9.3 The Core
- 9.4 The Shapkey Value
- 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures
- 9.6 Other Solution Concepts
- 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility
- 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility
- 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility
- Exercises
- Bibliographic Note
10. Cooperation under Uncertainty
- 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency
- 10.3 An Example
- 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers
- 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms
- 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability
- 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal
- 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions
- 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information
- Exercises
Bibliography
Index

Analysis of Conflict

Roger B. Myerson

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