Cover: Game Theory in PAPERBACK

Game Theory

Analysis of Conflict

Add to Cart

Product Details

PAPERBACK

$48.50 • £38.95 • €43.50

ISBN 9780674341166

Publication Date: 09/15/1997

Short

600 pages

6-1/8 x 9-1/4 inches

42 line illustrations, 29 tables

World

  • Preface
  • 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations
    • 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence
    • 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory
    • 1.3 Axioms
    • 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem
    • 1.5 Equivalent Representations
    • 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems
    • 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model
    • 1.8 Domination
    • 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems
    • Exercises
  • 2. Basic Models
    • 2.1 Games in Extensive Form
    • 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation
    • 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games
    • 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations
    • 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies
    • 2.6 Multiagent Representations
    • 2.7 Common Knowledge
    • 2.8 Bayesian Games
    • 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information
    • Exercises
  • 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games
    • 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability
    • 3.2 Nash Equilibrium
    • 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria
    • 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria
    • 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect
    • 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games
    • 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance
    • 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
    • 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria
    • 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria
    • 3.11 Auctions
    • 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium
    • 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets
    • Exercises
  • 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games
    • 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies
    • 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies
    • 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability
    • 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States
    • 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria
    • 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
    • 4.7 Games with Perfect Information
    • 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability
    • 4.9 Forward Induction
    • 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas
    • 4.11 Technical Proofs
    • Exercises
  • 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form
    • 5.1 Introduction
    • 5.2 Perfect Equilibria
    • 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria
    • 5.4 Proper Equilibria
    • 5.5 Persistent Equilibria
    • 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria
    • 5.7 Generic Properties
    • 5.8 Conclusions
    • Exercises
  • 6. Games with Communication
    • 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies
    • 6.2 Correlated Equilibria
    • 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication
    • 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems
    • 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility
    • 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts
    • 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games
    • 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria
    • 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games
    • Exercises
    • Bibliographic Note
  • 7. Repeated Games
    • 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
    • 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet
    • 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting
    • 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples
    • 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games
    • 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt
    • 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves
    • 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups
    • 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
    • 7.10 Continuous Time
    • 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games
    • Exercises
  • 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games
    • 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory
    • 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution
    • 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility
    • 8.4 Transferable Utility
    • 8.5 Rational Threats
    • 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions
    • 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game
    • 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information
    • 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game
    • 8.10 Renegotiation
    • Exercises
  • 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games
    • 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis
    • 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility
    • 9.3 The Core
    • 9.4 The Shapkey Value
    • 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures
    • 9.6 Other Solution Concepts
    • 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility
    • 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility
    • 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility
    • Exercises
    • Bibliographic Note
  • 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty
    • 10.1 Introduction
    • 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency
    • 10.3 An Example
    • 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers
    • 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms
    • 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability
    • 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal
    • 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions
    • 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information
    • Exercises
  • Bibliography
  • Index

Awards & Accolades

  • Roger B. Myerson Is Winner of the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics
The <i>Chevron</i> Doctrine: Its Rise and Fall, and the Future of the Administrative State, by Thomas W. Merrill, from Harvard University Press

From Our Blog

(logo) SpeakOUT: 50th Anniversary

Speaking with SpeakOut Boston

We continue our celebration of Pride Month by talking with some of the speakers who volunteer with SpeakOUT Boston. They share their stories with a variety of audiences to foster a better understanding of the LGBTQ+ community, so we thought we’d ask them some questions of our own.