Harvard University Press has partnered with De Gruyter to make available for sale worldwide virtually all in-copyright HUP books that had become unavailable since their original publication. The 2,800 titles in the “e-ditions” program can be purchased individually as PDF eBooks or as hardcover reprint (“print-on-demand”) editions via the “Available from De Gruyter” link above. They are also available to institutions in ten separate subject-area packages that reflect the entire spectrum of the Press’s catalog. More about the E-ditions Program »
- Preface
- 1. Organization and the Procedural Perspective
- The Procedural Perspective
- The Connections of the Various Components of the Book
- 2. Decision Occurrences
- The Inner Preference Set
- Decision Procedures
- Approximate Maximizing Procedures
- Are Noncalculating Procedures Optimal?
- The Yerkes-Dodson Law and Decision Procedures
- The Emotion Spillover Theory of Decision Making
- Inert Areas and Procedural Decisions
- The Employment Contract and Commitment Decisions
- Summary and Conclusions
- 3. On the Anatomy of Decisions
- Decision Triggers and Finalizatrons
- Options, Selection Rules, and Search Processes
- Notes on Procedures and Procedure Sets
- Conclusions
- 4. Economics of Inertia
- Modeling Inertial Frames
- Some Consequences of Inertia
- 5. Productivity: The Hidden Prisoner’s Dilemma Analysis
- Self-Interest and Trust: The Prisoner’s Dilemma Example
- The Productivity Problem in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Framework
- Peer Group and Golden-Rule Standards
- The Twofold Prisoner’s Dilemma Problem
- Summary and Conclusions
- 6. Conventions, Coordination, and Decisions
- The Theory of Conventions
- Conventions as a Formalism
- Does a Convention Have to Be Optimal?
- Summary and Conclusions
- 7. Conventions as a Solution to the Intrafirm Prisoner’s Dilemma Problem
- The Effort Convention
- Working Conditions and Wages
- Wages: Convention or Negotiation?
- On the Stability of Conventions
- Summary and Conclusions
- 8. Intrafirm Effort Decisions: Monitoring and Sanctions
- The Voluntarily Motivated Effort Hypothesis
- Hierarchical Sanctions
- Peer Sanctions and Sanction Levels
- Sanctions and Nonmaximizing Behavior
- Concluding Remarks
- 9. Equilibrium, Entrepreneurship, and Inertia
- Equilibrium and Quasi-Equilibrium
- What Do Entrepreneurs Do?
- The Supply of Entrepreneurs and n Achievement Theory
- Behavior of Firms under Loose Equilibrium
- Summary and Conclusions
- 10. An Implications Sampler
- Summary of Basic Postulates
- Effort Convention Implications
- Firm-Level Implications
- 11. The Power of Hierarchy
- The Power and Size of Hierarchy
- The Israeli Kibbutz: Size and Hierarchy
- The Hierarchical Solution to the Size Problem
- 12. Specialization, Hierarchy, and Internal Inefficiency
- Specialization, Effort, and Motivation
- Process Cuts, Specialization, and Recombinings
- Related Invisible “Cutouts”
- Hierarchical Levels, Distance, and Separations
- Controls, Incentives, and Motivations under Hierarchies
- Motivational Interdependencies and Hierarchy
- Vertical Groups
- The Commitment Network
- Internal Entrepreneurship and the Commitment Network
- Factionalism
- Autonomous Internal Organizations
- Summary
- 13. On Japanese Ethos, Culture, and Management
- Borrowing
- More on Confucianism
- The Social Anthropology Approach
- The Theory of Amae
- Summary
- 14. Japanese and Western Management Systems: The Contrasts
- The Career Elements of the JMS
- Lifetime Employment Ideal
- Jobs, Training, and Unions
- The Japanese Payment and Bonus System
- Community, Authority, and Consensus
- The Industrial Group
- Summary and Conclusions
- 15. Putting It All Together
- The Basic Model
- Pressure, Hierarchy, and Effort
- A Diagrammatic Treatment of the Model
- Sources of Inefficiency
- Efficiency Wages
- Some Concluding Remarks
- Appendix. Language, Choice, and Nonoptimization
- Comparative Language Problems
- Ex Ante versus Ex Post Arguments
- The Revealed Preference Case
- On Objective Function Misspecifications
- Are Nonoptimal Choices Always Translatable?
- The Disutility of Maximization
- Inertia, Inert Areas, and Utility
- Decision Making: Individuals versus Groups
- Language and the Concept of Technical Inefficiency
- Summary
- References
- Index