Cover: A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s <i>Phenomenology</i>, from Harvard University PressCover: A Spirit of Trust in HARDCOVER

A Spirit of Trust

A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology

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$45.00 • £36.95 • €40.50

ISBN 9780674976818

Publication Date: 05/01/2019


856 pages

6-1/8 x 9-1/4 inches

18 illus., 3 tables

Belknap Press


  • Reference Abbreviations
    • Introduction: A Pragmatist Semantic Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology
      • I. The Focal Topic: The Content and Use of Concepts
      • II. The Strategy of Semantic Descent
      • III. The Social Dimension of Discursiveness: Normativity and Recognition
      • IV. The Historical Dimension of Discursiveness: Recollective Rationality
      • V. Cognition, Recognition, and Recollection: Semantics and Epistemology, Normative Pragmatics, and the Historicity of Geist
  • Part One. Semantics and Epistemology: Knowing and Representing the Objective World
    • 1. Conceptual Realism and the Semantic Possibility of Knowledge
      • I. Classical Representational Epistemology
      • II. Genuine Knowledge and Rational Constraint
      • III. A Nonpsychological Conception of the Conceptual
      • IV. Alethic Modal and Deontic Normative Material Incompatibility
    • 2. Representation and the Experience of Error: A Functionalist Approach to the Distinction between Appearance and Reality
      • I. Introduction
      • II. Two Dimensions of Intentionality and Two Orders of Explanation
      • III. Two Kantian Ideas
      • IV. Hegel’s Pragmatist Functionalist Idea
      • V. The Mode of Presentation Condition
      • VI. The Experience of Error
      • VII. The Two Sides of Conceptual Content Are Representationally Related
      • VIII. Conclusion
    • 3. Following the Path of Despair to a Bacchanalian Revel: The Emergence of the New, True Object
      • I. The Emergence of the Second Object
      • II. From Skepticism to Truth through Determinate Negation
      • III. Recollection and the Science of the Experience of Consciousness
    • 4. Immediacy, Generality, and Recollection: First Lessons on the Structure of Epistemic Authority
      • I. Sense Certainty Introduced
      • II. Two Senses of “Immediacy”
      • III. A Bad Argument
      • IV. First Good Argument: Classification
      • V. Second Good Argument: Anaphoric Recollection
    • 5. Understanding the Object/Property Structure in Terms of Negation: An Introduction to Hegelian Logic and Metaphysics in the Perception Chapter
      • I. The Lessons of Sense Certainty
      • II. Determinateness and Exclusive Negation
      • III. Formal Negation and Two Orders of Explanation
      • IV. Properties and Objects
      • V. Two Metaphysical Roles of Objects
      • VI. Ten Kinds of Metaphysical Differences
      • VII. From Perception to Understanding
    • 6. “Force” and Understanding—From Object to Concept: The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities and the Laws That Implicitly Define Them
      • I. Forces as Allegorical for Theoretical Entities
      • II. Invidious Eddingtonian Theoretical Realism
      • III. Holism and the “Play of Forces”
      • IV. From Forces to Laws as Superfacts
      • V. The “Inverted World” and Possible-World Semantics
    • 7. Objective Idealism and Modal Expressivism
      • I. Explanation and the Expression of Implicit Laws
      • II. Objective Idealism
      • III. “Infinity” as Holism
      • IV. Expressivism, Objective Idealism, and Normative Self-Consciousness
  • Part Two. Normative Pragmatics: Recognition and the Expressive Metaphysics of Agency
    • 8. The Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-Consciousness and Self-Constitution
      • I. The Historicity of Essentially Self-Conscious Creatures
      • II. Identification, Risk, and Sacrifice
      • III. Creatures Things Can Be Something For: Desire and the Triadic Structure of Orectic Awareness
      • IV. From Desire to Recognition: Two Interpretive Challenges
      • V. Simple Recognition: Being Something Things Can Be Something for Is Something Things Can Be for One
      • VI. Robust Recognition: Specific Recognition of Another as a Recognizer
      • VII. Self-Consciousness
      • VIII. Conclusion
    • 9. The Fine Structure of Autonomy and Recognition: The Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes
      • I. Normative Statuses and Normative Attitudes: A Regimented Idiom
      • II. The Kantian Autonomy Model of the Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes
      • III. A Model of General Recognition
      • IV. A Model of Specific Recognition
      • V. The Recognitive Institution of Statuses, Subjects, and Communities
      • VI. The Status-Dependence of Attitudes
      • VII. Conclusion
    • 10. Allegories of Mastery: The Pragmatic and Semantic Basis of the Metaphysical Incoherence of Authority without Responsibility
      • I. Introduction: Asymmetrical, Defective Structures of Recognition
      • II. The Subordination–Obedience Model
      • III. Identification
      • IV. The Practical Conception of Pure Independence
      • V. The Struggle
      • VI. The Significance of Victory
      • VII. The Master–Servant Relationship
      • VIII. The Metaphysical Irony at the Heart of Mastery
      • IX. From Subjects to Objects
      • X. Recognition and Cognition
      • XI. The Semantic Failures of Stoicism and Skepticism
    • 11. Hegel’s Expressive Metaphysics of Agency: The Determination, Identity, and Development of What Is Done
      • I. Looking Ahead: From Conceptual Realism and Objective Idealism to Conceptual Idealism
      • II. Two Sides of the Concept of Action: The Unity and Disparity That Action Involves
      • III. Two Models of the Unity and Disparity That Action Essentially Involves
      • IV. Intentional and Consequential Specifications of Actions
      • V. Practical Success and Failure in the Vulgar Sense: The Vorsatz/Absicht Distinction
      • VI. Identity of Content of Deed and Intention
      • VII. Further Structure of the Expressive Process by Which the Intention Develops into the Deed
    • 12. Recollection, Representation, and Agency
      • I. Hegelian vs. Fregean Understandings of Sense and Reference
      • II. Retrospective and Prospective Perspectives on the Development of Conceptual Contents
      • III. Intentional Agency as a Model for the Development of Senses
      • IV. Contraction and Expansion Strategies
  • Part Three. Recollecting the Ages of Spirit: From Irony to Trust
    • 13. The History of Normative Structures: On Beyond Immediate Sittlichkeit
      • I. Epochs of Geist
      • II. Immediate Sittlichkeit
      • III. The Rise of Subjectivity
      • IV. Alienation and Culture
    • 14. Alienation and Language
      • I. Introduction: Modernity, Legitimation, and Language
      • II. Actual and Pure Consciousness
      • III. Recognition in Language
      • IV. Authority and Responsibility in Language as a Model of Freedom
      • V. Pure Consciousness: Alienation as a Disparity between Cognition and Recognition
      • VI. Faith and Trust
      • VII. Morality and Conscience
    • 15. Edelmütigkeit and Niederträchtigkeit: The Kammerdiener
      • I. Two Meta-attitudes
      • II. The Kammerdiener
      • III. The Authority of Normative Attitudes and Statuses
      • IV. Naturalism and Genealogy
      • V. Four Meta-meta-attitudes
      • VI. Looking Forward to Magnanimity
    • 16. Confession and Forgiveness, Recollection and Trust
      • I. Neiderträchtig Assessment
      • II. Confession
      • III. Forgiveness
      • IV. Recollection
      • V. The Conditions of Determinate Contentfulness
      • VI. Trust and Magnanimous Agency
      • VII. Hegel’s Recollective Project
    • Conclusion: Semantics with an Edifying Intent: Recognition and Recollection on the Way to the Age of Trust
      • I. Edifying Semantics
      • II. Geist, Modernity, and Alienation
      • III. Some Contemporary Expressions of Alienation in Philosophical Theories
      • IV. Three Stages in the Articulation of Idealism
      • V. Recollection: How the Process of Experience Determines Conceptual Contents and Semantic Relations
      • VI. From Verstand to Vernunft: Truth and the Determinateness of Conceptual Content
      • VII. Normativity and Recognition
      • VIII. Dimensions of Holism: Identity through Difference
      • IX. Truth as Subject, Geist as Self-Conscious
      • X. The Age of Trust: Reachieving Heroic Agency
      • XI. Forgiveness: Recognition as Recollection
  • Afterword: To the Best of My Recollection
  • Notes
  • Index

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